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As a general matter, the question of whether the federal govern-
ment may keep sexually dangerous individuals in custody past their
prison sentences would seem sufficiently controversial to keep the
public from asking "what's next?" But in the wake of United States v.
Comstock, which upheld Congress's power to create such a civil-com-
mitment scheme,' this question has taken center stage. Noting the
Court's reliance on a fungible "five-consideration test" and its explicit
rejection of the principle that any valid exercise of federal power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause may be no more than one
step from an enumerated power, 2 scholars have wondered how courts
might apply Comstock's reasoning to dramatic effect.
3
With the national debate over the proper role of the federal gov-
ernment intensifying, those predicting the impact of Comstock may not
have to wait very long. Indeed, one need not look much beyond the
context in which Comstock arose-the federal criminal justice system-
to see one of its most potentially controversial areas of application:
federal hate-crime laws.
Since their inception, federal hate-crime laws have been the sub-
ject of debate. For their opponents, federal hate-crime laws are but
one more example of the federal criminal-justice system's encroach-
ment on state power and a threat to the bedrock federalism principle
4
that the Constitution requires the separation between "what is truly
national and what is truly local."5 This threat is particularly strong, so
the argument goes, when it comes to those federal laws penalizing
conduct almost identical to that which is punishable under state law-
such as hate crimes.6 On the other side, supporters of federal hate-
crime laws emphasize that the realities of these crimes-the difficulty
of prosecuting them under existing federal law and the less-than-
1 See 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).
2 Indeed, Justice Thomas in his dissent criticized the five-consideration test as one
that "raises more questions than it answers." See id. at 1975 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3 See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court's Decision About Sexually Dangerous Federal
Prisoners: Could It Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate to Buy Health
Insurance?, FINDLAw (May 19, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html
(arguing that Comstock supports the constitutionality of a federal individual mandate to
purchase health insurance).
4 See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 801, 839-42 (1996) (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist's con-
cern that the "unchecked growth of federal criminal law threatens to create a crisis in the
federal justice system").
5 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000). For further discussion,
see infra Part III.C.3.b and text accompanying notes 194-95.
6 See discussion infra Part II.A.
932 [Vol. 97:931
HA VE NO FEAR
favorable track record of some states in doing so-make such laws a
necessity.
7
In October 2009, Congress significantly revised existing federal
hate-crime law by enacting the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA).8 In addition to removing the
requirement that victims of hate crimes based on race, color, religion,
or national origin be engaged in a "federally protected activity," the
HCPA broadened the definition of a federal hate crime to include
acts that are both motivated by the victim's gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or disability and satisfy a jurisdictional element con-
necting the act to interstate or federal activity. 9 As with many federal
criminal laws, Congress relied upon the Commerce Clause as its au-
thority for enacting the HCPA.10
But relying on the Commerce Clause as the only source of consti-
tutional authority for the HCPA should give us pause. The limits of
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause doctrine
have been the subject of considerable debate1 1 and, therefore, uncer-
tainty. With the healthcare and other recent policy controversies fo-
cusing attention once more on this question, 12 Commerce Clause
7 See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for
CriminalEnforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1230 n.7, 1236-37 (2000) (discussing congres-
sional testimony from government officials and others on the inadequacies of pre-HCPA
federal hate-crime legislation).
8 Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-4713, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835-44 (2009) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2009)).
9 See discussion infra Part II.B.
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 249 note (detailing various ways in which violent crime motivated by
bias "substantially affects interstate commerce"); Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy 7-8
(June 23, 2009), available at www.justice.gov/ola/views-letters/ 11 1-1/062309-s909-shepard-
hate-crimes-prevention-act.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (noting federal hate crimes
under § 249(a) (2) must occur "in at least one of a series of defined 'circumstances' that
has a specified connection with or effect upon interstate or foreign commerce"); Letter
from Robert Raben, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of Legislative Affairs,
to Senator Edward M. Kennedy 10 n.15 Uune 13, 2000), available at www.justice.gov/ola/
views-letters/111-1/062309-s909-shepard-hate-crimes-prevention-act.pdf (last visited Mar.
16, 2012) ("The jurisdictional elements in § 249(a) (2) (B) would ensure that each convic-
tion under § 249(a)(2) would involve conduct that Congress has the power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause.").
11 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1268-69 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) ("Seven words in the Com-
merce Clause-' [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States'-have spawned a
200-year debate over the permissible scope of this enumerated power." (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted)).
12 This uncertainty is manifest in the current debate over the significance of the dis-
tinction between "activity" and "inactivity" in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it
relates to challenges to the individual-mandate provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Compare Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768,
781 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defini-
tion of "economic activity" that would include requirement to purchase health insurance
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doctrine is ripe for further clarification and refinement. More specifi-
cally, justifying the HCPA as an exercise of Congress's Commerce
Power is also problematic because current Commerce Clause prece-
dent does not permit federal regulation of gender-motivated violence,
even in the aggregate, 13 and the HCPA extends the protection of hate-
crime laws to those who are victimized because of their actual or per-
ceived gender or gender identity, among other groups.
In light of the increased controversy and uncertainty surrounding
the Commerce Clause, this Note will consider whether Comstock's in-
terpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause may provide an alter-
nate avenue of constitutionality for the HCPA. In order to situate
Comstock in its broader doctrinal and historical context, Part I provides
a brief history of federal criminal laws and an overview of major deci-
sions affecting the scope of congressional authority to pass such laws,
including United States v. Lopez, 14 United States v. Morrison,15 and Gonza-
les v. Raich.16 Part II traces the development of federal hate-crime law
and discusses the important differences between the HCPA and prior
hate-crime legislation. Part III explains why the Commerce Clause
alone does not provide a firm constitutional foothold for the HCPA,
arguing instead that courts may uphold the HCPA under the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause as interpreted in
Comstock.
I
BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. History of Federal Criminal Law
To understand the relationship between Comstock and the HCPA,
a brief history of the development of federal criminal law and its
sources of constitutional authority is necessary. The Supreme Court
has long recognized the validity of Congress's implied power to im-
pose criminal sanctions for violations of federal law. 17 Discussion of
as "lack[ing] logical limitation and . . . unsupported by Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence"), with Michael C. Dorf, Judge Hudson's Misguided Focus on "Activity, "DORF ON LAW
(Dec. 14, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/12/judge-hudsons-mis-
guided-focus-on.html ("There is no constitutional prohibition on Commerce Clause regu-
lation of inactivity .... Consider . . . the provisions of federal labor law and federal
antitrust law that have been construed to forbid secondary boycotts. A boycott, of course,
is economic inactivity-a refusal to purchase goods or services from the target-in exactly
the same way that the non-purchase of health insurance is economic inactivity." (emphasis
omitted)).
13 See infra Part I.B (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
14 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
15 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
16 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
17 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) ("'All admit that the
government may, legitimately, punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among
934 [Vol. 97:931
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this authority, however, has always gone hand in hand with the recog-
nition of one of its greatest limitations-the "police power" of the
states. 18 The police power, which the Constitution reserves to the
states, 19 is the broad authority to pass laws to protect public health,
public morals, and public safety. 20 The principle that the police
power belongs to the states and thus limits the actions of the federal
government figured significantly in the drafting of the Constitution 2 1
and continues to play a role in modern controversies over the scope of
federal power under the Constitution. 22
Though federal criminal statutes date back to the late 1700s,23
the federal government did not significantly enter the domain of
criminal law until the early twentieth century.24 During this period,
Congress enacted such legislation as the Mann Act,25 which forbid the
interstate transportation of women for purposes of prostitution; the
Dyer Act,26 which forbid driving a stolen car across state lines and
related offenses; as well as laws restricting the transportation of lottery
tickets27 and obscene materials. 28 In addition to improvements in in-
terstate transportation, Prohibition was also a major contributor to the
growth of the federal criminal law, 29 resulting in the passage of the
the enumerated powers of Congress.'" (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819))).
18 See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6
OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 51, 53-54 & n.10 (2008) (citing New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co.,
115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885)).
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
20 See Logan, supra note 18, at 53.
21 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (describing this allocation of
power between the federal government and the states as "adopted by the Framers to en-
sure protection of our fundamental liberties" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (rejecting notion that its holding conferred a gen-
eral police power on the federal government); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618
n.8 (2000) ("[T]he principle that [tihe Constitution created a Federal Government of
limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power to the States, is deeply in-
grained in our constitutional history." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23 See I SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED AcrIONS:
CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS AcT AND RICO 2-3 (1998).
24 See Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the Scope of
Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1991, 1993-94 (2008).
25 Id. at 1994 (citing White-Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act), ch. 128, 36 Stat. 825 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421-2424 (2006))); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 327 (1993).
26 Id. (citing National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act), ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324 (1919)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 25,
at 265.
27 Rehn, supra note 24 (citing Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363
(1903)).
28 See id.
29 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 265-66.
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Volstead Act, which enforced the Eighteenth Amendment's ban on
the production, shipment, and sale of liquor.30 Federal criminal law
continued to grow into the latter half of the twentieth century. Today,
by some estimates there are more than 3,200 federal criminal laws.
3t
B. Scope of the Federal Criminal Legislative Power
The Constitution grants Congress almost no explicit power to
make criminal laws.3 2 The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted
this authority to rest implicitly in a number of constitutional provi-
sions.3 3 One such provision, and the basis upon which the Court up-
held the civil-commitment statute in question in Comstock, is the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 34 The Clause grants Congress the
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."3 5 The con-
trolling interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause remains
that of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional. '3 6 In this context, the Court has em-
phasized that the meaning of "necessary" is not "absolutely necessary"
and that statutes that are "plainly adapted" to the execution of a valid
power satisfy this requirement.37  But because the Clause is only a
means for Congress to execute its enumerated powers and not an in-
dependent source of power itself,38 courts have relied upon the
30 See Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 339.
31 DouGLAs HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 9 (2008).
32 The exceptions are those provisions granting Congress the explicit authority to
create the crimes of "counterfeiting," "treason," "[p]iracies and [f]elonies committed on
the high [s]eas," or offenses "against the Law of Nations." See United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10; art. III, § 3).
33 See id. at 1957 (providing examples of Congress's exercise of authority to pass laws
"in furtherance of ... its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,
to enforce civil rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to
establish post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, [and] to regulate naturalization").
34 See id. at 1956.
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
36 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
37 See, e.g., Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003) (holding federal statute
prescribing tolling period for state-law claims as "plainly adapted" to the "due administra-
tion ofjustice" in federal courts (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417, 421)).
38 But see Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five
Takes, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 915, 925 (2005) ("There are two ways of looking at the
Necessary and Proper Clause: as an independent source of power for Congress, or as an
adjunct-relating to means-in serving the ends spelled out in Congress's enumerated
[Vol. 97:931
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Clause to uphold a wide variety of legislation,39 including federal
criminal laws.
40
Another major source of authority for federal criminal law is the
Commerce Clause. 41 The Commerce Clause permits Congress "[t]o
regulate Commerce... among the several States. ' 42 Throughout the
history of the interpretation of the Clause, courts have wrestled with
the question of its precise scope and meaning. For most of the twenti-
eth century, Congress enjoyed broad authority to enact legislation
under this provision. 43 An often cited and powerful piece of evidence
for this proposition is that for most of the twentieth century, the Su-
preme Court did not invalidate a single law as exceeding the scope of
the Commerce Clause.
44
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence changed dramati-
cally, however, with its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez. In Lopez,
the Court invalidated a criminal statute prohibiting gun possession in
school zones on the grounds that it exceeded the scope of Congress's
authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 45 This abrupt en-
forcement of the limits of the Commerce Clause for the first time in
over half of a century precipitated academic controversy, 46 as well as a
flood of challenges to existing federal criminal legislation. 47 Further-
more in 2000, the Supreme Court held strong to the case's reasoning,
striking down the civil-liability provision of the Violence Against Wo-
men Act (VAWA) in Morrison because it shared some of the same con-
stitutional infirmities as the statute in Lopez.48 Together, these
powers. Marshall ... suggested that it was the latter, but interpreted things so expansively
that it has become, essentially, the former.").
39 See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 22 (2007) (upholding federal bank-
ing regulation on the ground that "[r]egulation of national bank operations is a preroga-
tive of Congress under the .. .Necessary and Proper Clause[ ]").
40 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1969 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)
(noting the Clause "provides the constitutional authority for most federal criminal stat-
utes"); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604-05 (2004) (upholding federal stat-
ute prohibiting bribery of officials of recipient organizations of federal funds as a necessary
and proper exercise of Congress's Spending Power).
41 See 1 WELLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 5 (noting that "[m]ost of the federal statutes
that are not aimed at protecting direct federal interests have been based on the commerce
power").
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (referring to mid-twentieth
century precedents that "ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause"); I WELLIG ET
AL., supra note 23, at 8.
44 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REv. 7, 8 (2001).
45 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
46 See Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 57, 64-65 (2002).
47 See 1 WELLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 13 ("There have been Lopez challenges to
virtually every criminal statute founded on the Commerce Clause.").
48 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14 (2000).
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decisions seemed to mark the end of the era of plenary legislative au-
thority under the Commerce Clause.
But in 2005, the Court changed course again in Gonzales v. Raich,
in which it rejected a challenge to the Controlled Substances Act's
(CSA) prohibition on possession of Class I drugs as applied to the
legal possession and noncommercial cultivation of marijuana for med-
ical purposes.49 While acknowledging Lopez and Morrison, Raich
largely bypassed the reasoning of these decisions; instead, it upheld
the application of the CSA under earlier precedents that established
Congress's power to reach local activities under the Commerce
Clause, so long as these activities were part of an "economic 'class of
activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce" and
were the kind that absent regulation would affect a national market.50
Most recently, uncertainty over Commerce Clause doctrine has arisen
in the context of challenges to the individual-mandate provision of
President Obama's healthcare legislation, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. 51 A closer look at Lopez, Morrison, and Raich is
thus necessary to understand the relationship between the Commerce
Clause and federal criminal law.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether Congress
had the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which made knowing possession
of a firearm on or within 1,000 feet of a school a federal offense.52
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade high-school student, was charged
and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) of the GFSZA after bringing a
handgun and several bullets to school.53 Lopez challenged his convic-
tion on the ground that the GFSZA exceeded the bounds of Con-
gress's authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 54
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by invok-
ing the principle that the powers of the federal government are "few
49 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-26 (2005).
50 See id. at 17-18, 32-33.
51 As of the publication of this Note, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to
resolve this very question. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/
supreme-court-to-hear-case-challenging-health-law.htnl?_r= 1 &scp=4&sq=supreme court
health care&st=cse; Compare Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub noma., Florida v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11400) (holding the
Act's "individual mandate" provision requiring the purchase of insurance exceeded Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause), with Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651
F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding the Act as a facially valid exercise of the Com-
merce Power).
52 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating 18 U.S.C.
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and defined," whereas those of the states are "numerous and indefi-
nite."55 The Court then emphasized that even its most generous inter-
pretations of the Commerce Clause recognized its "outer limits. '56
Next, the Court grouped valid Commerce Clause legislation into
three categories: (1) regulation of the "channels" of interstate com-
merce, (2) regulation of the "instrumentalities" of interstate com-
merce, and (3) regulation of activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. 57 After ruling out the "channels" and "instru-
mentalities" categories as possible bases upon which to uphold the
GFSZA, the Court concluded that the statute must pass constitutional
muster, if at all, under the third category-regulation of activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 58 Here, the Court noted
that because the statute targeted criminal conduct and facially "ha[d]
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise," it
was different from other statutes that the Court had upheld under the
"substantially affects" category.59 Next, the Court pointed to two criti-
cal defects in the statute: (1) a lack of ajurisdictional element limiting
its reach and (2) the absence of congressional findings specifying the
nature of the effect of the activities targeted by the statute on inter-
state commerce. 60 The lack of a jurisdictional element was problem-
atic because it allowed the statute to reach beyond "a discrete set of
firearm possessions that ... have an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce. '6 1 Similarly, the Court viewed the absence of
congressional findings on the relationship between intrastate gun pos-
session in school zones and interstate commerce as troublesome be-
cause it hindered the Court from determining whether gun
possession in school zones substantially affected interstate com-
merce.62 In concluding the answer was no, the Court rejected the
Government's argument that gun possession by increasing violent
crime overall affected "national productivity" and in turn interstate
commerce. 63 The Court refused to accept such a theory, arguing that
to do so would make it "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power," which would be particularly problematic in traditional areas
of state sovereignty such as education and the criminal law.
64
55 See id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
56 See id. at 556-57.
57 See id. at 558-59.
58 See id. at 559.
59 See id. at 561.
60 See id. at 561-63.
61 Id. at 562.
62 Id. at 563.
63 See id. at 563-64.
64 See id. at 564-66.
2012]
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The second important case limiting the scope of the Commerce
Clause was United States v. Morrison. As in Lopez, the Court struck down
legislation targeting "noneconomic activity" on the ground that Con-
gress failed to show the activity substantially affected interstate com-
merce.65 The legislation at issue was the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 (VAWA) ,66 which created a civil-liability67 remedy for victims
of "crime[s] of violence motivated by gender."68 Relying heavily on
Lopez, the Court pointed to several defects shared by the GFSZA and
the VAWA's civil-remedy provision: first, the "noneconomic" and
"criminal nature of the conduct at issue"; second, the lack of an ex-
press jurisdictional element; third, the absence or deficient nature of
the congressional findings; and fourth, the attenuated link between
the targeted conduct and the effect on interstate commerce. 69 The
Morrison Court, however, went beyond Lopez in limiting the role of
congressional findings, stating that the mere presence of such find-
ings "is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Com-
merce Clause legislation. '70 Though the VAWA contained numerous
findings detailing the effect of gender-motivated violence on inter-
state travel, employment in interstate business, and demand for inter-
state products, the Court rejected these findings as embodying the
same deficient reasoning put forth in defense of the GFSZA in Lopez. 71
The Court pointed to the danger of accepting this type of "but-for
causal chain" of reasoning, whereby the federal government could
demonstrate that virtually any act of violence would substantially affect
interstate commerce. 72 Such an approach would impermissibly green-
light federal encroachment into traditional areas of state concern,
such as the regulation of violent conduct and domestic matters. 73
Thus, in holding that the VAWA's civil-liability provision exceeded the
scope of the Commerce Clause, the Morrison Court made clear that a
65 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613, 617 (2000).
66 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (2006)).
67 Even though the provision of the VAWA before the Supreme Court provided for
civil and not criminal liability, it is still relevant to the discussion of the scope of federal
criminal law under the Commerce Clause because of the criminal nature of the conduct
giving rise to liability and the concerns that federal involvement in this area-whether by
the imposition of criminal or civil sanction-was a clear encroachment on the police
power of the states. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605-06, 615.
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (c).
69 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
70 See id. at 614.
71 See id. at 615.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 615-17 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.").
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congressional determination of whether a given activity substantially
affects interstate commerce was not decisive as to this question.
74
Despite predictions that Lopez and Morrison would drastically
change the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 75 the Court's
2005 decision in Raich blunted the impact of these decisions. In
Raich, the Court rejected an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to
the application of the CSA's prohibition of the possession of Class I
drugs to the intrastate possession of marijuana for medical purposes
that was legal under California law.76 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens first noted that long-standing Commerce Clause precedents
recognized Congress's authority to regulate "purely local activities that
are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. '7 7 Distinguishing the CSA provision at
issue from those invalidated in Lopez and Morrison, the Court empha-
sized that the CSA provision was one of the "essential" elements of a
"larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated." 78 Relying principally on Wickard v. Filburn,79 which upheld
Congress's power to regulate intrastate wheat production because of
its effect on the national wheat market, the Court reasoned that the
presence of the regulatory scheme permitted Congress to view intra-
state drug possession in the aggregate in order to demonstrate a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.80 Otherwise, as the Court
argued, "excis [ing]" off those parts of the regulatory scheme reaching
intrastate activity could compromise the effectiveness of the scheme
altogether.8'
Together, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich demonstrate the unpredict-
ability of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This may in
part explain why the Court chose to uphold the civil-commitment pro-
vision in Comstock under the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than
the Commerce Clause 82-perhaps to avoid complicating its jurispru-
dence with another strand of Commerce Clause analysis. More impor-
74 See id. at 614 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995))).
75 See Saylor, supra note 46, at 64 & n.48, 76 (noting that some courts and commenta-
tors viewed Lopez as touching off no less than a "federalism revolution" and that Morrison
showed Lopez was "not an aberration").
76 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
77 See id. at 17.
78 See id. at 17, 23-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
79 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
80 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
81 See id. at 22, 24-25.
82 The parties in the case argued for and against the constitutionality of the statute on
both grounds. See Brief for the United States at 42-43, United States v. Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 2896312.
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tantly, the uncertainty in the current Commerce Clause doctrine
shown by these cases, particularly with respect to legislation targeting
violent crime after Morrison, underscores the need to consider the
HCPA under Comstock's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as well as the Commerce Clause. This Note will discuss this
argument in greater detail in Part III.A.
II
MATrHEW SHEPARD AND JAMES BYRD, JR. HATE CRIMES
PREVENTION ACT (HCPA)
With the relevant background on federal criminal law develop-
ment and its sources of constitutional authority set forth, this Note
proceeds to a discussion of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act, including a brief overview of prior hate-
crime laws and their differences from the HCPA. This Note will then
argue why it is necessary to analyze the HCPA's constitutionality under
Comstock.
A. History of Federal Hate-Crime Laws
A hate crime, or bias-motivated crime as it is also known, is a
crime in which an individual is targeted because of his or her actual or
perceived identity as a member of a particular group or category of
individuals.83 The principal difference between hate crimes and
other offenses is that hate crimes typically require a showing that the
defendant acted with the motive to commit the crime against the par-
ticular individual because of the defendant's belief in that individual's
membership in a particular group.8 4 Though jurisdictions vary in
terms of which groups qualify for protection under hate-crimes laws,
85
common categories include race, color, national origin, ethnicity, re-
ligion, gender, sexual orientation, and disability.8 6 Hate-crime laws
generally penalize conduct that is punishable under other criminal
laws87 but impose steeper penalties because bias is the motive for the
83 See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, 10 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 279, 280 (David
Hong ed., 2009).
84 See id.
85 See Troy A. Scotting, Comment, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal Legisla-
tion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 869 (2001).
86 See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, supra note 83, at 280.
87 Scholars have argued, however, that while the elements of bias-motivated and non-
bias-motivated crimes are nearly identical, the harm resulting from the former is much
greater. See Susan B. Gellman & Frederick M. Lawrence, Agreeing to Agree: A Proponent and
Opponent of Hate Crime Laws Reach for Common Ground, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 422-24
(2004) (discussing unique harms of hate crimes such as stigmatization, psychological dis-
tress, and feelings of victimization).
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crime. 88 Numerous rationales have been offered to support the pas-
sage of special hate-crime legislation. These rationales include deter-
rence, the necessity to differentiate such crimes because of their
severity, and the imperative to signal to potential offenders society's
strong disapproval of such conduct.
89
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (CRA) marked Congress's first major
foray into the domain of hate-crime legislation. 90 It punished the
threat or use of force resulting in the injury, intimidation of, or inter-
ference with individuals because of their race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin and engagement in certain federally protected
activities, 9 1 such as attending a public school, traveling in or using in-
terstate commerce, or enjoying a state-provided benefit or activity.
9 2
The next two significant pieces of federal hate-crime legislation were
the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 199093 (HCSA) and the Hate Crimes
Sentencing Enhancement Act of 199494 (HCSEA), which, respectively,
required federal collection and publication of hate-crime statistics and
revised the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to allow for enhancement
of at least three offense levels for hate crimes. 95 Notably, the HCSEA
also provided for enhancement in the cases of crimes motivated by
bias based upon gender, sexual orientation, and disability, as well as
the categories of groups covered in the CRA.9 6
B. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act
Following the murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,
both of which involved evidence of bias as a motivation, calls in-
creased for broader federal hate-crime legislation covering instances
in which individuals were victimized because of sexual orientation and
88 See id. at 424-25. Ajurisdiction may impose harsher penalties through two mecha-
nisms: (1) "specific acts" hate-crime statutes and (2) sentencing enhancements. Whereas
"specific acts" statutes create a separate offense for when bias is the motive, sentencing
enhancements merely increase the offender's sentence for an offense not defined in terms
of bias. See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, supra note 83, at 281-82.
89 See Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 87, at 425, 428.
90 See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, supra note 83, at 280. Prior to the CRA, a
victim of a hate crime could recover damages through a federal statute imposing civil liabil-
ity upon those individuals who conspired to deprive "any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." See 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006).
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2) (2006); Scotting, supra note 85, at 876.
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2) (A), (B), (E).
93 Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note
(2006)).
94 Congress enacted this law as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2006)); Scotting, supra note 85, at 875.
95 See Scotting, supra note 85, at 873-75.
96 See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, supra note 83, at 282.
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gender.97 In 2000, building upon the momentum produced by public
outrage to the Shepard and Byrd murders, Senator Edward Kennedy
introduced legislation to fill the critical gaps in the existing federal
hate-crime regime. 98 Though the 2000 bill failed to pass the first time
around, in April of 2009 a nearly identical bill was reintroduced in
Congress.99 The following October, Congress enacted the Local Law
Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009,100 also known as
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention
Act.'
01
The HCPA, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 249, differs from existing hate-
crime legislation in two important ways. 102 First, § 249 lacks 18 U.S.C.
§ 245's "federally protected activities" requirement for conduct moti-
vated by the victim's actual or perceived race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin, imposing liability without a further showing of a causal
relationship between the offense and the victim's involvement in a
federally protected activity. 1 3 Second, § 249(a) (2) extends protec-
tion to more categories of individuals by imposing criminal liability on
whoever either willfully causes bodily injury or attempts to cause such
injury through the use of fire, a firearm or explosive device because of
not only the victim's "actual or perceived religion [or] national ori-
gin," but also "gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disabil-
ity."104 For individuals targeted because of their actual or perceived
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability, the HCPA
also requires proof that either the injury or attempt to injure occurred
in connection with one of the following circumstances:
(1) "the conduct.., occurs during the course of, or as a result of,
the travel of... the victim [ ] across a State line or national border [
] or using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or for-
eign commerce" (2) "the defendant uses a channel ... or instru-
97 See Scotting, supra note 85, at 853-54 nn.4-5.
98 See id. at 854-56; Letter from Ronald Weich to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, supra
note 10, at 2-3.
99 See Letter from Ronald Weich to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 3
n.2.
100 Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-4713, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835-44 (2009) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2009)).
101 9 FREDERICK K. GRITTNER, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 11342, at 64
(3d ed. Supp. 2011).
102 See Letter from Ronald Weich to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 10, at
1-2.
103 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 249(a) (1) (2006) ("Whoever ... willfully causes bodily injury
to any person or... attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person... shall be imprisoned not
more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both."), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 245(b) (2) (requiring that conduct be "because of [the victim's] race, color, religion or
national origin and because he is or has [participated in a federally protected activity]").
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A).
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mentality of interstate or foreign commerce" (3) "the defendant
employs a firearm . . . or other weapon that has traveled in inter-
state or foreign commerce" (4) "the conduct ... interferes with
commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is en-
gaged at the time of the conduct" or (5) "[the conduct] otherwise
affects interstate or foreign commerce."
10 5
III
UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK AND THE HCPA
A. Why the Commerce Clause Alone Cannot Save the HCPA
This Note will examine the effect of Comstock on the constitution-
ality of the second change to existing federal hate-crime law embod-
ied in § 249(a) (2) (A), which addresses offenses based upon gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. The provision states:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in any circum-
stance described in subparagraph (B) or paragraph (3), willfully
causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a fire-
arm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, at-
tempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or
perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gen-
der identity, or disability of any person-
(i) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance
with this title, or both .... 106
Before analyzing Comstock's impact on the HCPA, an explanation
is owed as to why. If Comstock upheld the civil-commitment statute
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 10 7 and § 249(a) (2) rests on
Congress's authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause, 0 8 why
apply Comstock to the HCPA at all? After all, if there is a valid basis for
upholding the law under the existing Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, why should courts reach the issue of how the legislation would
fare under Comstock's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause?
First, this question assumes a premise that is not necessarily
true-that in determining the constitutionality of the provision under
the Commerce Clause, the Court will analyze § 249(a) (2) by only ap-
plying Commerce Clause precedents. Though such an approach
105 See id. § 249(a) (2) (B) (i)-(iv). Section 249(a) (3) also criminalizes conduct de-
scribed in § 249(a) (2) (A) that occurs "within the special maritime or territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States," regardless of whether any of the five circumstances are present.
See id. § 249(a) (3).
106 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A).
107 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).
108 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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would not be uncommon, 10 9 the Court has also acknowledged an-
other possibility: analyzing whether a statute falls within Congress's
authority to act within the Commerce Clause in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 1 0 For example, Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in Raich suggested that legislation justified exclusively under the
Commerce Clause warranted distinct analytical treatment from legisla-
tion justified as a necessary and proper exercise of the Clause.111 In addi-
tion, before Comstock, district courts followed this approach in
determining the constitutionality of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act. 112 Therefore, the use of both approaches at a mini-
mum suggests there is an open question as to whether courts will treat
the HCPA as an exercise of Congress's power stemming from the
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or both.
Second, relying upon the Commerce Clause as constitutional
terra firma for the HCPA overlooks the uncertain status of bias-moti-
vated violence under the Commerce Clause. Though whether the
HCPA exceeds the scope of the Commerce Clause may not be the
most readily apparent constitutional question presented by the stat-
109 Indeed, this was the Court's approach in both Lopez and Morrison. See United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (framing the issue as merely whether the "[GFSZA]
exceed[ed] the authority of Congress [to regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States" without mentioning the Necessary and Proper Clause (internal quotation marks
omitted) (second alteration in original)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607
(2000) (same).
110 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) (framing the question presented
with both the Necessary and Proper Clause and Commerce Clause); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the VAWA civil-liability provision was a "necessary and
proper exercise" of Congress's Commerce Clause authority (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
111 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T] he power to regulate [activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce] cannot come from the Commerce Clause
alone. Rather . . . Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not
themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.").
112 E.g., United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132 (D. Haw. 2008) ("[T] he
interplay between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause may permit
Congress to regulate categories of activity beyond those that substantially affect interstate
commerce." (quoting United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1163 n.6 (D.
Mont. 2008))); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 328 (D. Mass 2007) (holding
the provisions of the Act at issue were a "a necessary and proper exercise of the federal
government's power under the Commerce Clause to prevent the commission of federal sex
crimes"); see also United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting a prior
determination of the Act's validity under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
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ute, 1 3 it is far from settled either. 1 4 In Morrison, the Court made
clear that the Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to "regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce" and that "[g]ender-moti-
vated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity."1 1 5  The determination that gender-motivated violence is
noneconomic played a significant role in the Morrison Court's analysis.
It counted as both an independent factor weighing against the deter-
mination that gender-motivated violence substantially affects inter-
state commerce and the basis for the Court's conclusion that the
congressional findings were also inadequate.'1 6 Moreover, the fact
that § 249(a) (2) contains a jurisdictional element1 17 does not immu-
nize the statute from constitutional attack. Although the Court in
both Lopez and Morrison identified a jurisdictional element as a factor
weighing in favor of a statute's constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause,' 1 8 it is not settled that the "mere presence of a jurisdictional
element . . . in and of itself insulate [s] a statute from judicial scru-
tiny." 119 Section 249 (a) (2)'s particular jurisdictional element, which
at a minimum requires only a showing that the activity in question
"otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce," 120 may prove espe-
cially problematic in this regard because courts interpret such lan-
guage as evincing congressional intent to reach the bounds of the
Commerce Clause. 12 1 This wide-ranging jurisdictional element cou-
pled with § 249 (a) (2)'s focus on noneconomic violence may cause
courts to discount the weight of the jurisdictional element as evidence
of the activity's substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the
113 Most of the debate over the statute's constitutionality concerns the First and Thir-
teenth Amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Beebe, No. 10-cr-03104 BB, 2011 WL
3416734, at *10-11 (D.N.M. Aug. 4, 2011) (holding § 249(a) (1) of the HCPA did not ex-
ceed Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power to enact laws eliminating the "badges and
incidents of slavery"); Glenn v. Holder, 738 F. Supp. 2d. 718, 728-29, 733-34 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (dismissing First Amendment challenge on standing grounds); see also Letter from
Ronald Weich to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 8 (dismissing First Amend-
ment concerns surrounding § 249).
114 See Christopher DiPompeo, Comment, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v.
Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. Rv. 617,
671-72 (2008).
115 529 U.S. at 613, 617.
116 See id. at 613-16.
117 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. A jurisdictional element is a "fact in-
cluded in a statute that ... serv[es] as a nexus between a particular piece of legislation and
Congress's constitutional power to enact that legislation." Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdic-
tion and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REv. 643, 679 (2005).
118 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
I19 See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471-73 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995)).
120 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2006).
121 See United States v. Morales-De Jesdis, 372 F.3d 6, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2004).
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HCPA's uneasy fit with Morrison's insistence that gender-motivated vio-
lence is beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause demonstrates the
need to consider whether Comstock's interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides an alternate avenue of constitutionality.
B. United States v. Comstock
In Comstock, the issue before the Court was the constitutionality of
the provisions of the Adam Walsh Child and Safety Protection Act of
2006 that created a federal post-sentence civil-commitment scheme
for individuals in federal custody, who, among other things, were de-
termined to be "sexually dangerous." 122 To qualify for civil commit-
ment, the individual in federal custody must "(1) ha[ve] previously
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child
molestation, (2) currently suffer[ ] from a serious mental illness, ab-
normality, or disorder, and (3) as a result... [be] sexually dangerous
to others, in that he would have serious difficulty in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." 123 The
scheme operates as follows: First, the federal government must certify
that the individual meets the above requirements and prove those
facts in federal court by "clear and convincing evidence."' 12 4 Assuming
the federal government meets its burden of proof, the court orders
the individual to remain in the custody of the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral. 125 Next, the Attorney General must "make all reasonable efforts
to cause" the state(s) in which the individual was tried or domiciled to
take custody of the individual and must release the individual if either
state accepts. 126 If neither state should accept, however, the individ-
ual remains in federal civil confinement until either a state assumes
responsibility for his or her "custody, care, and treatment" or the indi-
vidual is no longer deemed "sexually dangerous."'
12 7
The case arose when Graydon Comstock and four other individu-
als also certified as "sexually dangerous" petitioned for dismissal of
their certifications in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, challenging the constitutionality of the civil-commit-
ment scheme under both the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Commerce Clause, among other constitutional provisions. 128 The Dis-
122 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a) (5)-(6)).
123 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)).
125 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a)-(d)).
126 See id. at 1954-55.
127 See id. at 1955 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)(1)-(2)).
128 See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.C. 2007).
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trict Court held the statute unconstitutional on both grounds and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.
1 29
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It concluded that the
statute was within Congress's authority to legislate under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.1 30 In summarizing its analysis, the Court
pointed to five considerations supporting the statute's
constitutionality:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long
history of federal involvement in th [e] arena, (3) the sound reasons
for the statute's enactment in light of the Government's custodial
interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in
federal custody, (4) the statute's accommodation of state interests,
and (5) the statute's narrow scope.'
31
Regarding the first factor, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, be-
gan by emphasizing that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Con-
gress the "broad authority" to make all legislation that is either
"appropriate" to executing or that demonstrates a "means-ends ra-
tionality" with an enumerated power. 132 For example, because Con-
gress has the power to pass laws pursuant to its enumerated powers, it
also has the power to enforce those laws through criminal sanctions,
to create federal prisons to house violators of those laws, and to ad-
minister those prisons by preventing harm to prisoners, prison em-
ployees, and visitors. 133 Next, the Court pointed to the federal
government's long history of involvement in the fields of civil commit-
ment and regulation of prisoner mental health as the second consid-
eration supporting the statute's constitutionality under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Third, the Court concluded that the statute, in
reaching mentally ill and sexually dangerous individuals already in
federal custody, was a reasonable extension of the federal govern-
ment's existing civil-commitment scheme, which entailed the power
for the federal government to act as a "custodian" of federal prisoners
with a corresponding duty to protect the public from any harm those
prisoners may create. 134 Fourth, the Court pointed to the statute's
accommodation of state interests in its requirement that the U.S. At-
torney General notify the states where the individual was either domi-
ciled or tried of the individual's detention and to return the
individual to either state if it wished to assume custody.'35 Lastly, the
Court concluded that the link between the power to civilly commit
129 See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2009).
130 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
131 See id. at 1965.
132 See id. at 1956-57 (internal citations omitted).
133 See id. at 1957-58.
134 See id. at 1961-62.
135 See id. at 1962.
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and the power to pass criminal laws was not too attenuated, noting the
federal government's well-established power to criminalize activity
and the statute's effect on only a "small fraction" of prisoners.
13 6
C. Comstock and the HCPA
Applying Comstock to the HCPA raises a number of threshold
questions. First, because the lower courts have only recently begun to
apply the Comstock test,' 37 it is unclear whether and to what extent this
analysis will control all subsequent interpretations of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Given Comstock's explicit articulation of the fac-
tors underpinning its analysis, s38 however, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that each of the five considerations will have some influence in
subsequent Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence. 139 Second,
courts applying Comstock to § 249(a) (2) must decide whether to seek
to justify the statute as a necessary and proper exercise of an implied
power, such as the power to pass criminal laws or create prisons as in
Comstock, or as an exercise of the enumerated Commerce Power.
Though this Note need not decide this question, as both interpreta-
tions will likely involve application of the Comstock test, it argues that
courts will employ the latter approach. Again, the Comstock test is
comprised of the following five considerations:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long
history of federal involvement in th[e] arena, (3) the sound reasons
for the statute's enactment in light of the Government's custodial
interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in
federal custody, (4) the statute's accommodation of state interests,
and (5) the statute's narrow scope.'
40
Thus, this Note will apply each in turn to § 249(a) (2) of the HCPA.
136 See id. at 1964-65.
137 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1280-82, 1304 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) (describing the five-
consideration Comstock test and referencing those considerations in its analysis); United
States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137, 142-46 (5th Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc granted, 647 F.3d
605 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying each Coistock factor in upholding provision of the Sex Of-
fender Registration and Notification Act). Other courts have merely cited to Comstock in
discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause without applying the decision's five-considera-
tion test. See, e.g., United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1286-88 (10th Cir. 2011)
(noting inquiry under Necessary and Proper Clause was whether federal statute criminaliz-
ing sex offender's failure to register was " ' rationally related' to the enforcement of Con-
gress's sex offender registration scheme").
138 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
139 But see Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d at 142 (noting that while "[Comstock's] five considera-
tions must be part of [the court's] assessment here .... Camstock does not require that
every one of these considerations be present in every case").
140 Constock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
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1. Breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause
In Comstock, the Court began its analysis of the "breadth" factor by
reiterating a number of key principles for interpreting the scope of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. First, courts must examine whether
the statute in question "constitutes a means that is rationally related to
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power."1 41 Sec-
ond, other constitutional provisions besides the Necessary and Proper
Clause must not prohibit the statute in question.1 42 Third, courts
must examine the nature of the connection between the statute and
the constitutional power to determine "whether the means chosen are
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under [an
enumerated power] or under other powers that the Constitution
grants Congress the authority to implement. '143 Lastly, the Court
stressed its deference to Congress's judgment on the "choice of
means" by which it effectuates the stated goal of the legislation.
144
The Court then noted several examples of well-recognized implicit
powers authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, such as the
powers to pass criminal laws, to create prisons for violators of such
laws, and to safely and responsibly administer those prisons by regulat-
ing prisoner health and safety and prison access.
145
The "breadth" factor will probably weigh in favor of § 249 (a) (2)'s
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause. By inferring
Congress's power to civilly commit sexually dangerous individuals al-
ready in federal custody from the implicit power to enact criminal
laws in furtherance of its enumerated powers,' 46 Comstock strongly re-
inforced the validity of the federal criminal legislative power. Moreo-
ver, in explicitly rejecting the argument that every implicit power may
be no more than one inferential step from an enumerated power,
147
the Court may have signaled a willingness to view federal power more
expansively, or at least, to not assign critical weight to the fact that a
statute does not fall unambiguously within the ambit of an enumer-
ated power to the "naked eye" in assessing its constitutionality. 148 In
141 See id. at 1956-57.
142 See id. at 1957. Here, the Court explicitly noted that the issue of whether the civil-
commitment scheme violated the Due Process Clause was not before it. Id. at 1956.
143 See id. at 1957 (internal citations omitted).
144 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing past jurisprudence address-
ing the scope of congressional power as applying a "presumption of constitutionality" to
legislative action).
145 See id. at 1957-58.
146 See id. at 1956-58.
147 See id. at 1963-64 (maintaining its holding did not violate the principle that courts
must not "'pile inference upon inference' in order to sustain congressional action under
Article I" (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995))).
148 This is markedly different from the Lopez Court's approach in determining whether
the Gun-Free School Zones Act fell within the scope of the Commerce Clause. There, the
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other words, the fact that a statute may fall close to the limit of a fed-
eral power may matter less to a court deciding whether the statute in
fact exceeds that limit.
One objection to this interpretation of the "breadth" factor is that
it lacks a clear limiting principle. If the breadth of the Necessary and
Proper Clause counts in favor of constitutionality whenever Congress
exercises its implied power to pass criminal statutes, would it not
amount to a "plus" factor whenever a criminal statute is at issue? Such
an interpretation seems arbitrary, if not also inconsistent with the
Court's view of the primacy of the states in the domain of criminal
law. Moreover, interpreting this factor as an automatic "plus" for a
whole category of laws would seem to gut the chief advantage of a
balancing test as a judicial rule of decision, which is that it permits a
closer accounting of the specific facts of a case than a bright-line
rule. 149
But the lack of a clear limiting principle does not necessarily
render the preceding interpretation of the "breadth" factor unwork-
able. Rather, it merely suggests that the factor will not be very helpful
in distinguishing cases and that courts will likely discount its weight in
order to avoid a mechanical validation of federal criminal laws. Thus,
though it will not likely count for much, the breadth factor will likely
support the constitutionality of § 249(a) (2), regardless of whether
courts consider the Clause in conjunction with the Commerce Power
or an implied power.
2. Long History of Federal Involvement in the Arena
The Court began its discussion of this factor by noting that a "set
of federal prison-related mental-health statutes . . .ha[s] existed for
many decades."' 50 While acknowledging that a history of federal in-
volvement in a given arena was not dispositive as to whether that in-
volvement was constitutional in the first place, the Court nevertheless
considered such history to be "helpful in reviewing the substance of a
congressional statutory scheme."' 51 The Court traced federal involve-
ment in the arena of mental health treatment and confinement back
to the establishment of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC
Court emphasized that the lack of congressional findings demonstrating how gun violence
substantially affected interstate commerce was problematic precisely because
"no ... substantial effect [of gun violence] was visible to the naked eye." See 514 U.S. at
563.
149 See Michael C. Dorf, Brennan and Unstructured Balancing, DoPR ON LAw (Nov. 18,
2010, 12:03 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/11/brennan-and-unstructured-balanc-
ing.html (suggesting some legal questions are best decided by a kind of "all-things-consid-
ered judgment" typical of unstructured balancing tests).
150 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958.
151 See id. at 1958 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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in 1855 for insane members of the army and navy and other individu-
als.1 52 The Court went on to discuss the extension of the federal civil-
commitment regime between 1948 and 1949 to cover insane or men-
tally incompetent individuals with prison terms about to expire who
posed a threat to the "safety of the officers, the property, or other
interests of the United States"'153 and for whom "suitable arrange-
ments for the custody and care of the prisoner are not otherwise avail-
able."1 54 Viewing the principal difference between 18 U.S.C. § 4248
and those civil-commitment statutes in existence since 1949 as the fo-
cus on "sexually dangerous" mentally ill persons, as opposed to just
mentally ill persons, the Court concluded that § 4248 was no more
than a "modest addition" to the existing federal civil-commitment
scheme.
155
This factor should also weigh in favor of § 249(a) (2). First, given
the Court's broad approach in defining the area of federal involve-
ment in Comstock and under related Commerce precedent in Raich,
courts will likely also do so with respect to § 249 (a) (2). In assessing
the "reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and pre-
existing federal interests" in Comstock, the Court began by noting not
only Congress's long history in the arena of civil commitment but also
"the delivery of mental health care to federal prisoners." 156 Rather
than merely examining Congress's involvement in civil commitment,
the Court placed the government's effort in the broader context of
mental health care and treatment of prisoners. 157 Similarly, in Raich,
when considering the validity under the Commerce Clause of the ap-
plication of provisions of the CSA criminalizing marijuana possession
to intrastate possession of the drug for medical use,1 58 the Court
looked not only to past federal regulation of marijuana, but to the
broader history of the CSA as "a comprehensive framework for regu-
lating the production, distribution, and possession of five classes of
controlled substances.' 5 9 Thus, with respect to § 249(a) (2) of the
HCPA, courts will likely take a similarly broad view, defining the arena
of federal involvement as hate-crime legislation generally and not
152 See id. at 1958-59.
153 See id. at 1960 (quoting Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 285, 63 Stat. 686, 687
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4241-4247) (2006)). As Comstock noted, Congress
amended this statutory language in 1984 to allow for civil commitment where "release
would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the
property of another." See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)).
154 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1952) (amended 1984)).
155 See id. at 1961.
156 See id. at 1958.
157 See id.
158 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
159 See id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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merely laws targeting crimes motivated by bias based upon gender or
sexual orientation.1
60
Like in the arenas of civil commitment and prisoner mental-
health care, Congress's efforts to combat hate crimes date back to the
nineteenth century with the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871,
which prohibited conspiracies to deprive individuals or classes of indi-
viduals of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and im-
munities under the laws."16' The "federally protected activities"
statute created through the Civil Rights Acts of 1968,162 which paral-
lels Congress's overhaul of the civil-commitment regime upon recom-
mendation of the Judicial Conference in 1945,163 also serves as
evidence of long-standing involvement, along with the HCSA and the
HCSEA. 16
4
One aspect of the "long history of federal involvement" factor
that remains in question after Comstock is whether courts should take
into account the corresponding degree of state involvement in that
arena. 165 While the majority did not discuss the role of states in civil
commitment much beyond noting their failure on occasion to "as-
sume responsibility" for insane individuals about to be released from
federal custody,166 state involvement was a concern for both the dis-
senting and concurring Justices. 67 The dissent, written by Justice
Thomas and joined in part by Justice Scalia, noted the historic powers
of the states "to care for the mentally ill" and "to protect the commu-
nity from the dangerous tendencies of some mentally ill persons."'168
Justice Thomas was particularly troubled by the fact that the use of
federal civil commitment at issue "closely resemble [d] the involuntary
civil-commitment laws that States have enacted under their parens pa-
triae and general police powers."' 69
160 However, even if courts were to narrow the arena of involvement to only criminal
legislation targeting gender- or sexual-orientation-based violence, it could still look to the
criminal provision of the Violence Against Women Act as evidence of similar, if not identi-
cal, prior federal involvement in the field. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
n.5 (2000) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2006)).
161 See Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, supra note 83, at 280 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (2006)).
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006).
163 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1959 (2010).
164 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
165 State involvement in the arena should be distinguished from a specific statute's
accommodation of state interests, which is a separate consideration in the test.
166 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1959.
167 See id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1967-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sover-
eignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause ....")
168 See id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 See id.
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Though such concerns did not sway the majority in Comstock, they
could be material under a different set of facts. This is a distinct possi-
bility with respect to § 249(a) (2) because nearly every state has some
form of hate-crime legislation, and as of 2008 over twenty states in-
clude gender, sexual orientation, and disability among their protected
categories. 170 Many states, however, also have civil-commitment stat-
utes, 71 a fact that did not appear to substantially counteract the evi-
dence of the federal government's involvement in the arena in
Comstock. Thus, while difficult to predict exactly how, courts' consider-
ation of the degree of state involvement in applying this factor will
likely play a greater role in the future.
3. Sound Reasons for the Statute's Enactment in Light of the
Government's Custodial Interest
In the third part of the Comstock test, the Court concluded that
Congress "reasonably extended its longstanding civil-commitment sys-
tem to cover mentally ill and sexually dangerous persons who are al-
ready in federal custody, even if doing so detains them beyond the
termination of their criminal sentence" because 18 U.S.C. § 4248 was
both (1) within the scope of "Congress' power to act as a responsible
federal custodian" and (2) a "reasonably adapted" exercise of that
power.1 72 With respect to the first point, the Court, drawing upon
past precedent and the common law of torts, reasoned that the fed-
eral government's civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons
was similar enough to other legitimate actions taken in its custodial
role, such as restraining prison residents or delaying the release of
federal prisoners with infectious diseases until the threat subsides, to
qualify as a necessary and proper exercise of congressional legislative
authority.1 73 On the second point, the Court concluded that the stat-
ute was a "reasonably adapted" means of exercising this power be-
cause Congress reasonably determined that the federal government's
failure to provide for the continued confinement of sexually danger-
ous persons in federal custody would result in those individuals' re-
lease into the public in a reasonable number of cases. 174
Because this factor requires evaluating the connection between
the constitutional power and the statute as the means for exercising
170 See State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://wvw.adl.
org/learn/hate-crimeslaws/mapframeset.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
171 See Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers & Nat'l Ass'n of Fed. Of-
fenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23, United States v. Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 3727683 (noting that nineteen states currently
authorize civil commitment of sexually violent persons).





that power, it turns more closely than the other factors on whether
courts will analyze the statute as an exercise of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in furtherance of the Commerce Power or in further-
ance of an implied power, like the power to act as a custodian of fed-
eral prisoners in Comstock. Therefore, this Note will analyze this factor
under each approach separately below.
a. Section 249(a)(2) as an Exercise of the Necessary and Proper
Clause and an Implied Power
One notable aspect of the Comstock decision is that it upholds the
civil-commitment statute as an exercise of an implied power that is
more than one degree from an enumerated power. 175 Though this
analysis may open the door to the recognition of a limited number of
implied powers, courts will most likely not use this approach with re-
spect to § 249(a) (2) for two reasons. First, the "custodial power" over
federal prisoners is distinct in its link to the well-established federal
power to pass criminal laws. 176 It is difficult to envision another im-
plied power that would have a similarly close link to an implied power
of nearly incontrovertible validity. 177 Thus, courts will likely use this
approach sparingly.
Second, courts are also unlikely to recognize an implied power in
the case of the § 249(a) (2) because the most likely candidate for such
a power-something akin to the role of the federal government as a
historic protector of civil rights 8-would run headlong into the
Court's jurisprudence on Congress's enumerated power to enforce
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to "enforce, by
appropriate legislation" 179 the provisions of the Amendment, includ-
ing its guarantee to all persons of the "equal protection of the
laws."180 The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted the Section
Five power broadly, permitting Congress to deter and remedy consti-
tutional violations "even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of au-
tonomy previously reserved to the States." 181 More recently, however,
175 See id. at 1963-64.
176 See id. at 1957 (noting Congress's "broad authority" and "routine[ ] exercise[ ]" of
its power to enact criminal laws).
177 See discussion supra note 145 and accompanying text.
178 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 172-75 (2008).
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
180 Id. § 1.
181 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the Court imposed additional limitations on its exercise.18 2 For exam-
ple, in Morrison, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action, and thus the
civil-remedy provision of the VAWA, which targeted private gender-
motivated violence and not the actions of state officials, was not within
Congress's Section Five authority to enforce the Amendment's guar-
antees.1 83 The Court also reiterated the requirement that Section Five
legislation must demonstrate "congruence and proportionality" be-
tween the means adopted and the constitutional violation sought to
be remedied or prevented and concluded that remedies for victims of
gender-motivated violence were not sufficiently directed to remedying
discrimination by state officials to satisfy this standard.18 4 Thus, be-
cause it is doubtful that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the chief provision by which Congress enforces constitutional guaran-
tees against discrimination, authorizes the enactment of § 249 (a) (2),
it seems unlikely that the courts would justify it under a substantively
similar implied power.
b. Section 249(a)(2) as an Exercise of the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Commerce Power
It is more likely that courts will apply Comstock in the context of
determining whether § 249(a) (2) is a necessary and proper exercise
of the enumerated Commerce power rather than a more remote im-
plied power. Again, since the Court in Comstock took the latter ap-
proach in upholding § 4248 and did not discuss other circumstances
in which courts should apply the five-consideration approach, it is not
clear if or how Comstock will bear on this kind of analysis.
One possible understanding of Comstock in this context is that it
merely reiterates the long-standing Necessary and Proper Clause re-
quirement that the statute be "reasonably adapted" to the exercise of
the enumerated power.1 85 The Court's explanation of this require-
ment as amounting essentially to a "means-end rationality" test 8 6 is
somewhat problematic in the context of the Commerce Power be-
cause, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion, the
Court's prior jurisprudence has required the somewhat different test
of a "tangible link" between the targeted activity and interstate com-
merce.18 7 Perhaps the Court's affirmation of the means-ends ration-
182 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1952-53
(2003).
183 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000).
184 See id.
185 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010).
186 See id. at 1962.
187 See id. at 1966-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ality test as the appropriate standard under the Necessary and Proper
Clause suggests that this formulation of the test will prevail, despite
any apparent discrepancies with past Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.1
88
If courts should follow this approach and treat the third factor of
Comstock as a means-end rationality test in analyzing § 249(a) (2) as an
exercise of the Commerce Power, this factor would also weigh in favor
of the statute's constitutionality. As Justice Kennedy noted in his con-
currence in Comstock, rationality review is a highly deferential stan-
dard, requiring only that "there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it."189 In light of Congress's findings in the
HCPA that bias-motivated crime substantially affects interstate com-
merce by impeding the movement of target groups and their partici-
pation in commercial activities and that such crimes often involve
either crossing of state lines or the use of the channels of or materials
that have traveled in interstate commerce,190 a court could easily con-
clude that the HCPA was at least a rational exercise of Congress's au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce.
This conclusion, however, does not square well with the Court's
analysis of congressional findings on the effect of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce in Morrison. There, the Court dis-
counted the weight of a similar set of findingst 91 because of their reli-
ance on the kind of "but-for causal chain" of reasoning the Court
found so problematic in Lopez.192 As in Lopez, the Morrison Court re-
jected the argument that gender-motivated violence in the aggregate
could substantially affect interstate commerce because such a position
would presumably permit Congress to regulate other types of violent
crime and unduly intrude upon the police power of the states. 193 The
Court reasoned this kind of intrusion was impermissible because, as in
188 See generally Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist
Court, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761, 779-85 (2008) (discussing the Court's differing
treatments of the relationship between the rational basis test and the Commerce Clause in
Lopez, Morrison, and Raich).
189 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)).
190 See Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-13, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835-44 (2009) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2009)).
191 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (noting congressional find-
ings that, among other things, gender-motivated violence impacts interstate commerce "by
deterring potential victims from traveling interstate [and] from engaging in employment
in interstate business" and "by diminishing national productivity" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
192 See id.
193 See id. at 615-16.
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Lopez, "[t] he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local."194
Although the Court's explicit rejection of the application of the
aggregation principle to violent conduct in order to demonstrate a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce 101 5 would appear to cast
doubt on the strength of the HCPA's findings, this may not necessarily
be the case. The notion of distinct and nonoverlapping spheres of
national and local activity that the Court relied upon in Morrison has
become increasingly problematic as a workable principle of constitu-
tional interpretation in federalism cases.1 96 Though often repeated,
this principle reflects less and less the nuanced reality of increased
federal involvement over time in areas of traditional state sovereignty,
such as criminal and family law, 19 7 and in particular the regulation of
sex-offenders.198 Indeed, the Raich Court's decision to uphold the ap-
plication of a federal statute prohibiting possession of medical mari-
juana against a contrary legislative judgment by California in the
realm of drug policy, a traditional area of state control, is a recogni-
tion of this point. 99
As the preceding analysis illustrates, there are a number of open
questions as to how courts should apply the "sound reasons" factor of
the Comstock test to exercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
conjunction with the Commerce Clause, particularly given Morrison's
insistence that gender-motivated violence may not be aggregated to
show an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. However,
courts will probably assess the HCPA under Comstock for means-end
rationality, since to do otherwise would greatly diminish the influence
of Comstock, virtually limiting the case to its facts. Moreover, given the
Comstock Court's willingness to apply a means-end rationality level of
scrutiny to Congress's exercise of an implied power, it seems likely
that courts would apply at least the same, if not a more deferential
level of scrutiny, to the exercise of an enumerated power such as the
Commerce Clause.
194 See id. at 617-18.
195 See id. at 617.
196 See id. at 645 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("[T]he theory of traditional state concern as
grounding a limiting principle has been rejected previously, and more than once."); Grag-
lia, supra note 188, at 762 (arguing that "divided supremacy is an oxymoron" and federal-
ism cannot be "maintained as a matter of constitutional law enforceable by courts").
197 See 1 WELLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 ("The accumulation of [federal criminal]
statutes has now reversed the pattern that held for this nation's first century: the bulk of
the federal criminal code now treats conduct that is also subject to regulation by the
states."); Saylor, supra note 46, at 58-60 (discussing complications arising from viewing
family law as the exclusive domain of the states).
198 See Logan, supra note 18, at 84-88.
199 See 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005); id. at 11 (noting the relatively late entry of the federal
government into the field of marijuana regulation).
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i. Statute's Accommodation of State Interests
The fourth consideration in the Comstock test was that the civil-
commitment scheme "properly account[ed] for state interests."
20 0
First, the Court rejected the argument that § 4248 violated the Tenth
Amendment on the ground that the states have long been involved in
the commitment of mentally ill individuals. 20 1 The Court emphasized
that the Tenth Amendment explicitly assigns to the states those pow-
ers not prohibited to it by the Constitution as well as "[t] he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution," a category which in-
cludes both Congress's enumerated and implied powers. 20 2 Second,
while maintaining that federal involvement in a traditional area of
state sovereignty did not doom the statute under the Tenth Amend-
ment, the Court noted favorably the statute's requirements that the
U.S. Attorney General encourage the state or states where the individ-
ual was either tried or domiciled to take custody for the individual and
transfer the individual immediately if an official of either state at any
time exercised this right.20 3 Since this feature of the statute showed
more deference to state interests than the statute's predecessor, which
the Court upheld in Greenwood v. United States,20 4 the Court thus con-
cluded that it must meet the minimum threshold of accommodation
of state interests required by the Tenth Amendment.
2 0 5
Like the civil-commitment scheme in Comstock, the HCPA simi-
larly protects state interests by limiting the circumstances in which the
federal government may prosecute hate crimes. 20 6 It permits the fed-
eral government to prosecute crimes in only one of four circum-
stances: when (1) "the State does not have jurisdiction," (2) "the State
has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdiction," (3)
"the verdict or sentence obtained pursuant to State charges left de-
monstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in eradicating bias-
motivated violence," or (4) "a prosecution by the United States is in
the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice."
20 7
One might object that the latter two circumstances, which allow
federal prosecutions when it is necessary to vindicate a federal interest
or to "secure substantial justice," are much less narrow than the condi-
tions in Comstock, which permit civil commitment only after the state
or states where the individual was tried or domiciled have refused to
200 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1962-63 (2010).
201 See id. at 1962.
202 See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
203 See id. at 1962.
204 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
205 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963.
206 See 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1) (2006).
207 See id.
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take custody for the individual. 208 Indeed, the HCPA's language re-
garding vindication of federal interests closely resembles that of the
U.S. Department of Justice's Petite Policy, an internal directive that
limits federal prosecutions successive to a state prosecution for the
same conduct to cases in which the federal government has a compel-
ling interest in the prosecution and the Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral approves it.209 Some criticize the broad "compelling federal
interest" language of the Policy as leading partially to its "erratic and
inconsistent" application. 210 The HCPA is susceptible to the same ob-
jection; that is, that the language limiting federal involvement is too
open-ended to qualify as solid evidence of the statute's accommoda-
tion of state interests.
But this objection overlooks two important aspects of Comstock's
reasoning. The first is that Comstock's treatment of the Tenth Amend-
ment illustrates a movement away from the "traditional spheres of sov-
ereignty" approach for deciding questions of constitutional allocation
of power. Rather than give substantial weight to the fact that the sub-
ject matter of the contested federal action fell in a traditional sphere
of state sovereignty, the Court examined the degree to which the spe-
cific statute recognized state interests. 21' Thus, an objection based
largely on a concept of mutually exclusive spheres of federal and state
legislative action with rigid boundaries will not likely be persuasive. 212
Second, the appropriate degree of accommodation may vary from
statute to statute. In the area of hate-crime prosecutions, there may
be less need for accommodation than in the area of civil commitment
because the law already recognizes the coexistence of overlapping
zones of state and federal action in criminal law through the dual-
sovereignty doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
208 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
209 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2007), available at
http://ww.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.031
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (identifying the purpose of the Policy as "vindicat[ing] substan-
tial federal interests"); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977) (describing
purpose of Petite Policy as "protecting the citizen from any unfairness that is associated
with successive prosecutions based on the same conduct").
210 JonJ. Jensen & Kerry S. Rosenquist, Satisfaction of a Compelling Governmental Interest
or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One, 69 N.D. L. REv. 915, 918-19 & n.80 (1993).
211 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962 ("Nor does this statute invade state sovereignty or
otherwise improperly limit the scope of powers that remain with the States." (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
212 Cf Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1287 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
80 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) ("[T] he [Supreme] Court's attempts
throughout history to define by 'semantic or formalistic categories those activities that were
commerce and those that were not' are doomed to fail." (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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Amendment.21 3 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive
prosecutions for the same offense. 2 14 There is an exception, however,
where the federal government seeks to prosecute an individual al-
ready prosecuted by a state because the federal government and the
individual states are different sovereigns, and thus cannot prosecute
the defendant for the "same" offense. 2 15 Thus, while the HCPA may
not quite reach Comstock's level of accommodation of state interests,
courts will likely view this discrepancy more than anything else as a
function of the different levels of existing state and federal involve-
ment in the area of civil commitment as opposed to criminal-law
enforcement.
ii. Statute's Narrow Scope
The fifth and final consideration of the Comstock test was that the
civil-commitment statute was "narrow in scope" and that the "links be-
tween [it] and an enumerated Article I power [were] not too attenu-
ated."2 16 Here, the Court notably rejected the respondents' argument
that any exercise of Congress's implied power may be no more than
one step away from an enumerated power because such a limitation
was at odds with Congress's undisputed authority to "imprison people
who violate . . . (inferentially authorized) laws" and "provide for the
safe and reasonable management of... prisons."2 17 It concluded the
statute was sufficiently narrow in scope, pointing out that it "ha[d]
been applied to only a small fraction of federal prisoners."218 This
narrowness was significant, according to the Court, because it pro-
vided a safeguard against future courts interpreting Comstock as a grant
213 See Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sover-
eignty Doctrine, 102 YALE LJ. 281, 281-82 (1992) ("Th[e] [dual sovereignty] doc-
trine . . . justifies reprosecution by state authorities of defendants tried before federal
courts, reprosecution by federal authorities of defendants tried before state courts, and
reprosecution by state authorities of defendants tried before the courts of another state."
(footnotes omitted)).
214 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ").
215 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 195-96 (1959).
216 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963-64. Since the inquiry into the adequacy of the link
between the statute and an enumerated power seems much more salient when the statute
isjustified by a more remote implied power-like the power to act as a custodian of prison-
ers-than when it is a more direct exercise of an enumerated power-like the power to
regulate interstate commerce-it will probably not make much of a difference in the case
of the HCPA, where, assuming courts analyze the statute under the Commerce Clause in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the latter is the case.
217 See id. at 1964.
218 See id. (noting that the statute had been applied to only 105 individuals out of
188,000 federal inmates).
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to the federal government of the general police power reserved to the
states. 2
19
This Comstock factor will likely pose the greatest obstacle for
§ 249 (a) (2). Unlike the civil-commitment statute in Comstock, which
the Court noted had been applied to only 105 out of a total of 188,000
federal prisoners, 220 it is not clear that § 249(a) (2) will reach a simi-
larly narrow group of individuals. On the contrary, by expanding the
definition of federal hate-crime offenders to those who commit crimes
on account of an individual's gender, gender identity, disability, or
sexual orientation in addition to race, color, national origin or religion,
§ 249(a) (2) could result in a not-so-insignificant expansion of the fed-
eral hate-crime regime. As Attorney General Eric Holder noted in his
testimony on the HCPA before the Senate Judiciary Committee, sex-
ual-orientation-motivated hate crimes are the third most common
kind of hate crime besides those motivated by either racial or religious
bias.221 Moreover, some research on hate-crime statistics demon-
strates that gay individuals are more likely than members of other vic-
timized groups to report hate crimes, 222 which suggests § 249(a) (2)
might also lead to more hate-crime prosecutions. Though the Justice
Department's Petite Policy could restrain this expansion, 223 this seems
at odds with the rationale for the statute, which is that the existing
number of prosecutions under state-level hate-crime legislation does
not sufficiently serve the federal interests at stake when a hate crime is
committed.224
Section 249(a) (2) is also less narrow than the Comstock's civil-com-
mitment scheme in that it potentially brings more individuals into fed-
eral criminal justice system rather than merely providing for
continued custody of those already there. This distinction may prove
important in analyzing § 249(a) (2) given the Court's emphasis in
Comstock that the statute at issue would not permit the federal govern-
ment to civilly commit those who had served their sentences and fin-
ished their terms of supervised release. 225 In the case of § 249(a) (2),
however, which extends the federal government's criminal jurisdic-
tion to a new set of crimes and potential-offenders, there is no custo-
dial or other special relationship between the federal government and
219 See id. at 1964-65.
220 Id. at 1964.
221 The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 6 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
222 See William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical
Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1213, 1233-34 (2004) ("[G]ay people are therefore about eight
times more likely to report a hate crime than are non-gay persons.").
223 See Hearing, supra note 221, at 4 & n.3; supra note 209 and accompanying text.
224 See Hearing, supra note 221, at 5-6.
225 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964-65.
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the offender that courts could point to as evidence of the statute's
"narrow" quality. Thus, the "narrowness" factor will most likely not
weigh in favor of the HCPA.
Although Comstock provided little guidance on how its five-consid-
eration test should be applied, on balance § 249(a) (2) of the HCPA
should pass muster under the Necessary and Proper Clause in con-
junction with the Commerce Clause for several reasons. First, four of
the five considerations specified in Comstock favor the constitutionality
of § 249(a) (2). The breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, his-
tory of federal involvement in the arena, means-end rationality be-
tween the statute and its purpose, and accommodation of state
interests all support the conclusion that Congress acted within its au-
thority in enacting the HCPA.226 Though reasonable counterargu-
ments exist for why each of these factors weigh against the
constitutionality of the statute, they all share the same fatal flaw: reli-
ance on the traditional notion of separate zones of state and federal
activity for deciding federalism questions-an approach the Court has
deployed increasingly less in recent years.
But unlike the first four considerations, the "narrowness" factor is
problematic for § 249(a) (2) of the HCPA; it is not clear that the stat-
ute will have a similarly limited application, both in terms of the quan-
tity and type of individuals it reaches. However, because much of the
Court's analysis under this factor focused on the requisite strength of
the connection between chains of multiple implied powers and be-
cause the courts most likely will analyze the HCPA under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the enumerated
Commerce Power, this factor may be less relevant in this case and
therefore less likely to override the weight of the other four factors
supporting the constitutionality of the scheme.
CONCLUSION
Despite the initial controversy sparked by Comstock's validation of
the federal government's power to civilly commit sexually dangerous
individuals in federal custody, the case may ultimately be remembered
for the question it did not answer: namely, how should courts relate
the five considerations underlying the Comstock test and in which cir-
cumstances apply them?22 7 With the scope of federal power a topic of
national debate once more228 and doctrinal uncertainty over the
Commerce Clause growing, the lower courts will likely not have to
wait very long to address this question.
226 See supra Part III.C.
227 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
228 See cases cited supra notes 12 & 51.
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The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act could prove to be the vehicle through which the lower courts
come to terms with Comstock's gaps. Though some maintain that the
statute falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause alone, this con-
clusion is open to doubt given the doctrinal uncertainty surrounding
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence and, in particular, its dictate that
gender-motivated violence may not be aggregated to show a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.
As this Note argues, however, Comstock's interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause coupled with the Commerce Clause may
provide an alternate avenue of constitutionality for the HCPA. Four
of the five considerations of the Comstock test clearly weigh in favor of
the statute: First, whatever minimal weight the "breadth of the Neces-
sary and Proper clause" factor will have, it will likely support the con-
stitutionality of the statute. Second, like in Comstock, there is a long
history of federal involvement in the relevant arena, with federal hate-
crime laws dating back to the late nineteenth century. With respect to
the third and fourth factors, the statute is also likely "reasonably
adapted" to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, and,
though perhaps not to the extent of the civil-commitment scheme in
Comstock, sufficiently accommodates state interests. Lastly, though the
fifth consideration of the Comstock test, the narrowness inquiry, will
likely not add to the balance for the HCPA, the weight of this factor
will not be significant given its uneasy fit with criminal statutes gener-
ally and not just the HCPA. Thus, considering the weight of the four
factors against one, Comstock should place § 249(a) of the HCPA on
firmer constitutional ground.
20121
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